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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent empirical ﬁndings (e.g., Ongena and Smith, 2000a; Ongena and Smith, 2000b)
suggest a widespread use of multiple-bank lending. In almost all countries even rel-
atively small ﬁrms borrow from several banks at the same time. The distribution of
the number of bank relationships per ﬁrm varies substantially across countries, but
single-bank lending tends to be quite rare and multiple-bank lending often consists
of many banks.1
Explaining the great use of multiple-bank lending requires an understanding of
what advantages it can provide to both ﬁrms and banks. This widespread phe-
nomenon seems somewhat puzzling and contrasts with the “classical” theory of banks
as delegated monitors originating from Diamond (1984). This theory argues that ex-
clusive bank-ﬁrm relationships are optimal as they avoid duplication of screening
and monitoring eﬀorts as well as free-riding.2 Recent contributions have put forth
some potential explanations of ﬁrms’ choice of multiple-bank lending. These include
ﬁrms’ desire to mitigate hold-up and overmonitoring problems as well as the liquid-
ity risk aﬀecting exclusive bank-ﬁrm relationships (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Von
Thadden, 1992; Carletti, 2004; and Detragiache et al., 2000). Concerning banks’
choice, multiple-bank lending enables banks to commit not to extend further ineﬃ-
cient credit, thus solving the soft-budget-constraint problem of single-bank lending
and reducing ﬁrms’ strategic defaults (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Bolton and
Scharfstein, 1996). Also, the mitigation of the hold-up problem improves ﬁrms’ in-
centives to make proper investment choices, thus increasing banks’ proﬁts (Padilla
and Pagano, 1997).
The above mentioned explanations do not provide an answer, however, to the
apparent contradiction between the great use of multiple-bank lending and the pre-
dictions of the theory of banks as delegated monitors. If monitoring is one of the
main functions −if not the main function− that banks exert, especially in small and
medium business lending, why should they decide to share ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing if this
reduces their monitoring function? Does the great use of multiple-bank lending sug-
gest that the role of banks as delegated monitors is of minor importance? Or does
multiple-bank lending entail some −previously unnoticed− beneﬁts for banks’ incen-
1Ongena and Smith (2000b) ﬁnd that 20% of the ﬁrms in their sample of 1079 ﬁrms from 20
European countries use eight or more banks. Detragiache et al. (2000) report that 89 percent of
Italian small ﬁrms borrow from multiple banks with the median number of relationships being ﬁve.
They report also a median number of two relationships for US small ﬁrms.
2See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a review of the modern theory of ﬁnancial intermediation and
Boot (2000) for a more speciﬁc review of the literature on relationship banking.
2tives to monitor? These questions are critical especially in lending where monitoring
is important, banks retain some bargaining power and can decide the preferred lend-
ing structure. They are also timely as the ongoing process of deregulation expands
loan markets, and it confronts banks with the issues of how to enter into new markets
and monitor new clients.
This paper argues that, when one considers explicitly banks’ incentives to monitor,
multiple-bank lending may become an optimal way for banks with limited lending
capacities to commit to higher monitoring levels. Despite involving free-riding and
duplication of eﬀorts, sharing lending allows banks to expand the number of loans
and achieve greater diversiﬁcation. This mitigates the agency problem between banks
and depositors and reduces the cost of funding. Thus, diﬀerently from the classical
theory of banks as delegated monitors, the paper suggests that multiple-bank lending
may positively aﬀect overall monitoring and increase ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. The result
provides a possible theoretical rationale for the ﬁnding in Houston and James (1996)
that ﬁrms borrowing from multiple banks (but not from other multiple creditors)
have greater growth opportunities.
Building on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we address these issues in a one-period
model which endogenizes banks’ incentives to monitor. There are three types of
agents: Firms, banks and investors. Firms need external funds to undertake invest-
ment projects and can privately decide whether to exert eﬀort and increase project
success probabilities. Banks can ameliorate this moral hazard problem through mon-
itoring, which is however costly and not observable. This unobservability introduces
another moral hazard problem between banks and depositors. Banks’ incentives to
monitor depend on whether they lend to ﬁrms individually or share lending with
other banks. Multiple-bank lending improves banks’ monitoring incentives by allow-
ing banks to ﬁnance more projects and reach greater diversiﬁcation; but it entails also
free-riding and duplication of eﬀorts. Banks choose to share lending whenever the
beneﬁt of greater diversiﬁcation in terms of higher per-project monitoring dominates
the costs of free-riding and duplication of eﬀorts. The attractiveness of multiple-bank
lending decreases with the amount of inside equity and project proﬁtability, and it
increases with the cost of monitoring. Thus, the model predicts a greater use of
multiple-bank lending when banks are small relative to the projects they ﬁnance,
when ﬁrms are less proﬁtable, and when poor ﬁnancial integration, strict regulation
and ineﬃcient judicial systems make monitoring more costly. These predictions ﬁnd
empirical support in Ongena and Smith (2000b) and in Detragiache et al. (2000).
The key aspects of the analysis are banks’ moral hazard problem and limited lend-
3ing capacities. The incentive mechanism of diversiﬁcation works only if banks raise
deposits. If banks are non-leveraged, greater diversiﬁcation decreases the variance of
the average portfolio return, but it has no eﬀects on banks’ monitoring incentives.
Then multiple-bank lending entails lower overall monitoring than individual-bank
lending due to free-riding and duplication of eﬀorts, and it is no longer optimal.
Banks value greater diversiﬁcation because they have limited lending capacities.
In the model lending is restricted by the presence of capital requirements, but other
stories which limit banks’ diversiﬁcation opportunities are in line with our theory. For
example, restrictions (regulatory as well as economic) to banks’ geographical scope
and sector specialization may impose such limits and justify multiple-bank lending.
The novelty of this paper is to explain why banks may prefer to share lending
even if this implies free-riding and duplication of eﬀorts in their monitoring activities.
Given the need and importance of monitoring, the results of the model are particularly
applicable to the ﬁnancing of small and medium businesses and, to some extent, to
the formation of loan syndicates.3
This paper is related to a number of others. First, it relates to the literature
on banks’ incentives to monitor. Besanko and Kanatas (1993) rely on the non-
contractibility of monitoring to explain the coexistence of banks and capital markets
in a context where only one bank operates and monitors. Carletti (2004) analyzes how
banks’ incentives to monitor change with the number of bank relationships and how
this aﬀects ﬁrms’ optimal borrowing choice. Similarly, Winton (1993) analyzes the
monitoring incentives of multiple shareholders. None of these papers, however, look
at the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on banks’ monitoring incentives and advantages from
sharing lending. In this respect, our paper relates to Diamond (1984) and Cerasi and
Daltung (2000). However, whereas they focus on how diversiﬁcation inﬂuences moni-
toring incentives in a single-bank context, we use the incentive eﬀect of diversiﬁcation
to analyze the optimality of multiple-bank lending.4
The paper shares insights also with the literature on ﬁnancial structure as a com-
mitment to monitor. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Chiesa (2001) and Almazan
(2002) we focus on the importance of inside equity and capital requirements, but we
enrich the framework by introducing multiple monitors and diversiﬁcation oppor-
tunities. Thakor (1996) analyzes the optimal number of banks ﬁrms approach for
3Capital requirements, lending limits, banks’ need of greater diversiﬁcation are indeed the main
reasons for syndicates (Simons, 1993; Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000), which may lead, however, to
free-riding (Esty and Megginson, 2003).
4A contrasting view is in Winton (1999), where diversiﬁcation may worsen a bank’s incentive to
monitor and increase its chance of failure when loans are suﬃciently exposed to sector downturns.
4credit in a model where banks perform screening and are subject to capital require-
ments. Firms always approach multiple banks, as this reduces the probability of
being rationed. By contrast, we analyze banks’ choice between individual-bank and
multiple-bank lending, in a context where banks perform postlending monitoring and
entering into multiple-bank relationships is not always optimal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the basic
model. Section 2 analyzes banks’ choice between individual-bank and multiple-bank
lending. Section 3 discusses the importan c eo fb a n kl e v e r a g ea n dS e c t i o n4t h er o -
bustness of the basic model. Section 5 contains the empirical implications. Section 6
concludes.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Consider a two-date economy (T =0 ,1) with three classes of risk neutral agents:
numerous ﬁrms, banks and investors. Firms have access to an investment project
each, and need external funds to ﬁnance them. Only bank lending is available, and
banks can decide either to ﬁnance ﬁrms on their own −individual-bank lending− or
to share lending with other banks −multiple-bank lending.
Projects are risky and their returns are i.i.d. across ﬁrms. Each project i requires 1
unit of indivisible investment at date 0, and yields a return Xi = {0,R} at date 1.
The success probability of each project i, pi =P r {Xi = R}, depends on the behavior
of its entrepreneur. It is pH if he behaves well, and pL if he misbehaves, with pH >p L.
Misbehavior renders entrepreneurs a non-transferable private beneﬁt B,w h i c hc a n
be thought of as a quiet life, managerial perks, and diversion of corporate revenues
for private use. There is a moral hazard problem because entrepreneurs’ behavioral
choices are not observable.
Banks have E units of capital each and raise D units of deposits (henceforth, also
debt) from dispersed investors. Firms receive ﬁnancing only if banks expect non-
negative proﬁts, i.e., if they expect a return at least equal to the gross proceeds y ≥ 1
from an alternative investment. To provide a role for bank monitoring, we assume
that simple lending is not feasible, i.e.,
pH R>y>p LR + B,( A 1 )
and
∆p(R −
y
pH
) <B ,( A 2 )
5where ∆p = pH − pL. Assumption (A1) means that projects are creditworthy only
if ﬁrms behave well. Assumption (A2) implies that private beneﬁts are suﬃciently
high to induce ﬁrms to misbehave even when loan rates are set at the lowest level
y
pH which makes banks break even. Thus, simple lending is not feasible; and, because
ﬁrms cannot be given monetary incentives to behave well, we assume for simplicity
that banks extract the full project returns R.5
Suppose now that banks can ameliorate ﬁrms’ moral hazard problem through moni-
toring. Each bank j chooses to monitor project i with an intensity mij ∈ [0,1], which
determines the probability with which it observes ﬁrm i’s behavior and improves it in
the case of misbehavior. Monitoring is costly; an intensity mij costs C(mij)=c
2m2
ij.
The convex cost function reﬂects the greater diﬃc u l t yf o rab a n kt oﬁnd out more
and more about a ﬁrm; and it means diseconomies of scale in monitoring. The size
of the monitoring costs is determined by the parameter c (henceforth, also referred
to as cost of monitoring).
Banks’ monitoring intensities are not observable either to investors or to other
banks. This introduces another moral hazard problem in the model, and it implies
that banks can raise deposits only if they can credibly promise investors an expected
return at least equal to the proceeds y from the alternative investment.
To create a role for multiple-bank lending, we assume that banks have restricted
lending capacities. One way to think about it is to consider that banks are subject
to a capital constraint ratio 1
β (with β > 1), which limits their amounts of lending to
βE. As a consequence, banks raise an amount of deposits equal to
D =( β − 1)E,( A 3 )
and may not be able to perfectly diversify by themselves.67
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of date 0 banks choose
between individual-bank lending and multiple-bank lending; their choice is observable
to both investors and other banks. Then, each bank oﬀers investors a deposit contract
specifying the per-unit deposit rate. If investors accept the contract, each bank j
5Of course, this rules out also the possibility of direct lending between ﬁrms and investors.
6Banks do not have incentives to raise an amount of deposits greater than (β−1)E since investing
in the alternative safe investment gives them zero proﬁts.
7The assumption of limited diversiﬁcation opportunities creates a potential role for multiple-
bank lending. If it was not satisﬁed, banks could perfectly diversify by themselves and multiple-
bank lending would never be optimal. See also the discussion about alternative diversiﬁcation
opportunities in Section 4.
6chooses the intensity mij with which to monitor project i.A td a t e1p r o j e c tr e t u r n s
are realized and claims are settled. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model if
investors accept the deposit contracts.
T=0 T=1
|| | |
banks decide each bank oﬀers each bank projects
whether to be individual a deposit contract chooses its mature;
lenders or enter into to investors monitoring claims
multiple-bank relationships intensity mij are settled
Fig. 1. Timing of the model.
3 Banks’ Equilibrium Choices
The model is solved as follows. We ﬁrst take banks’ choice between individual-bank
and multiple-bank lending as given, and we characterize the equilibrium of each sce-
nario. Second, we analyze banks’ optimal lending choice.
3.1 Individual-bank Lending
We start by characterizing the equilibrium of the game with individual-bank lending
(henceforth IL). Each bank ﬁnances D + E projects and sets the deposit rate at the
lowest level at which investors are willing to deposit their funds. Then, each bank
chooses the monitoring intensity with which to monitor each project. For simplicity,
since banks act independently of each other and we look for symmetric equilibria
where they all behave identically, we focus on a single representative bank.
Let r be the deposit rate and mi be the bank’s monitoring intensity. The success
probability of each project i is equal to
pi = pi(mi)=pH − (1 − mi)∆p.
The deposit contract carries a bankruptcy risk, since the bank may not be able to
repay investors the promised deposit rate. The size of such a risk depends crucially on
the monitoring intensities m1...mD+E. The higher mi, the higher the project success
probability, and the more the bank can honor its repayment obligations. In case of
default, depositors split the realized return of the bank portfolio. We can express
the diﬀerence between the deposit rate r and the eﬀective repayment that investors
receive in terms of expected shortfalls as follows.
7Deﬁnition 1 Let the expected shortfalls of the individual-bank lending game be
S = S(m,r)=
Z D
D+Er
−∞
(r −
D + E
D
z)h(z)dz,
where m = m1...mD+E is the D +E-dimensional vector of the monitoring intensities
exerted by the bank on each of the D+E projects, and z = 1
D+E
D+E P
i=1
Xi is the average
sample return of a portfolio of D + E projects distributed according to the Normal
density function h(z) with mean R
D+E
D+E P
i=1
pi and variance ( R
D+E)2
D+E P
i=1
pi(1 − pi).8
Investors’ expected return per unit of deposit is then equal to
r − S;( 1 )
and the bank’s expected proﬁti sg i v e nb y
π(m,r)=
D+E X
i=1
piR − yE − [r − S]D −
c
2
D+E X
i=1
m
2
i, (2)
where the ﬁrst term is the expected return from the D+E projects the bank ﬁnances,
the second term is the opportunity cost of the bank’s capital, the third term is de-
positors’ expected return, and the fourth term is the total cost of monitoring D + E
projects.
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium of the individual-bank lending game.
Proposition 1 The unique symmetric equilibrium of the individual-bank game, in
which each bank monitors each project with intensity mi = mIL and oﬀers the deposit
rate rIL, is characterized by the solution to the following equations:
∆pR +
∂SIL
∂mILD − cm
IL =0 , (3)
r
IL − S
IL = y, (4)
where SIL = S(mIL,r IL).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The monitoring intensity mIL and the equilibrium deposit rate rIL depend −both
directly and indirectly through the expected shortfalls− on the amounts of deposits
D and inside equity E, the project return R, and the cost of monitoring c.
8The Binomial distribution of the variable z is well approximated with a Normal distribution
when (D + E)p(1 − p) > 10 (see, e.g., Ross, 1976).
8As already mentioned, raising deposits implies the well-known moral hazard prob-
lem of external ﬁnancing. Since monitoring is not observable and the deposit rate is
set before monitoring is decided, raising deposits makes the bank lower monitoring
to reduce costs and avoid sharing the beneﬁt with the investors. This mechanism is
captured by the second term in (3), which is negative as lower monitoring increases
the expected shortfalls. The moral hazard problem impacts the equilibrium deposit
rate (4), which, in turn, worsens the problem.
The severity of the moral hazard problem depends on the amount of inside equity
E, the cost of monitoring c, and the project return R. For a given level of debt,
ah i g hE reduces the moral hazard problem and improves monitoring through the
eﬀect on the expected shortfalls. As it allows the bank to ﬁnance more projects
and reach a greater degree of diversiﬁcation, a high E reduces the variance of the
distribution of the average sample return z.T h i si n c r e a s e st h eb e n e ﬁt of monitoring
accruing to the bank, and it reduces the expected shortfalls. A low c (or a high
R) improves the bank’s incentive to monitor and decreases the expected shortfalls.
Thus, the equilibrium monitoring intensity with individual-bank lending mIL grows
with the amount of inside equity and the project return, whereas it falls with the cost
of monitoring. The opposite happens for the equilibrium deposit rate.
3.2 Multiple-bank Lending
We now turn to the equilibrium of the game with multiple-bank lending (henceforth
ML). As before, the equilibrium requires that each bank j sets the deposit rate rj to
satisfy investors’ individual rationality constraint, and that each bank j chooses the
monitoring intensity mij for each project i so as to maximize its expected proﬁt.
The diﬀerence with the individual-bank lending game depends on how banks share
project ﬁnancing and interact in their monitoring decisions. We assume that each
bank shares ﬁnancing with other k−1b a n k ss ot h a ti ti n v e s t s1 /k unit in each of the
k(D + E)p r o j e c t si nr e t u r nf o rR
k in case of project success. All banks choose how
much to monitor each project simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The individual
monitoring intensities, however, are interrelated in the impact on the ﬁrm’s behavior.
It is enough that one bank discovers misbehavior to induce good entrepreneurial
behavior and increase the success probability of the whole project. The idea is that
monitoring delivers a public good, and all banks ﬁnancing a ﬁrm beneﬁts from the
higher success probability of the project.
9The success probability of project i with multiple-bank lending is then equal to
p
k
i = p(Mi(mi1...mik),k)=pH −
Yk
j=1(1 − mij)∆p = pH − (1 − Mi)∆p,( 5 )
where Mi =1−
Qk
j=1(1−mij) is the total monitoring intensity that the k banks exert
in project i.
Similarly to before, we can deﬁne the expected shortfalls on the deposit contract
as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 Let the expected shortfalls of the multiple-bank lending game be
S
k = S(M,r)=
Z D
k(D+E)rj
−∞
(rj −
k(D + E)
D
v)g(v)dv, (6)
where M =[ M1...Mk(D+E)] is the k(D + E)−dimensional vector of the total mon-
itoring intensities that all k banks exert on each of the k(D + E) projects, and
v = 1
k(D+E)
k(D+E) P
i=1
Xi i st h ea v e r a g es a m p l er e t u r no fap o r t f o l i oo fk(D + E) projects
distributed according to the Normal density function g(v) with mean 1
k(D+E)
R
k
k(D+E) P
i=1
pk
i
and variance
³
1
k(D+E)
´2 ³
R
k
´2 k(D+E) P
i=1
pk
i(1 − pk
i).
Investors’ expected return per unit of deposit is equal to
rj − S
k;( 7 )
and bank j’s expected proﬁti sg i v e nb y
π
k
j(M,r)=
k(D+E) X
i=1
p
k
i
R
k
− yE −
h
rj − S
k
i
D −
c
2
k(D+E) X
i=1
m
2
ij,( 8 )
where the ﬁrst term represents the expected return from the k(D+E) projects bank
j ﬁnances, the second term is the opportunity cost of capital, the third term is depos-
itors’ expected return, and the fourth term is the total cost of monitoring k(D + E)
projects.
Expressions (5) and (8) show the features of the multiple-bank lending game.
First, for given lending capacity, banks can ﬁnance more projects and reach a greater
degree of diversiﬁcation than with individual-bank lending. Each bank can ﬁnance
k(D + E) projects instead of D + E. Second, the success probability of each project
depends on the monitoring of all k banks. This creates a free-riding problem: because
monitoring is privately costly and not observable, each bank has an incentive to
10reduce its own eﬀort and beneﬁts from the other banks’ monitoring. Third, there
is a duplication of eﬀorts because banks do not coordinate in the choice of their
monitoring intensities.
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium of the multiple-bank lending game.
Proposition 2 The unique symmetric equilibrium of the multiple-bank lending game,
in which each bank monitors each project with intensity mij = mML and oﬀers the
deposit rate rj = rML is characterized by the solution to the following equations:
∆pR
k
(1 − m
ML)
k−1 +
∂SML
∂mMLD − cm
ML =0 , (9)
r
ML− S
ML = y, (10)
where SML = S(MML,r ML).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Comparing equations (9) and (10) with (3) and (4) shows how the equilibrium in the
multiple-bank game diﬀers from the one in the individual-bank game. Free-riding and
duplication of eﬀorts tend to curtail banks’ incentives (term 1
k(1 − mML)k−1), thus
increasing the expected shortfalls and pushing towards higher deposit rates. Greater
diversiﬁcation pushes, however, in the opposite direction. The equilibrium monitoring
intensity mML and the equilibrium deposit rate rIL balance these contrasting eﬀects.
Importantly, because of the greater number of banks monitoring the same project,
multiple-bank lending may imply higher per-project total monitoring than individual-
bank lending even if the individual monitoring intensity is lower, i.e., even if mML <
mIL. As we will show in the next subsection, whether this happens depends crucially
on the marginal eﬀect of diversiﬁcation, which is in turn determined by the amount
of inside equity E, the cost of monitoring c, and the project return R.
3.3 The choice between Individual-bank Lending and Multiple-
bank Lending
We analyze now banks’ choice between individual-bank and multiple-bank lending.
Once we substitute in (2) and (8) assumption (A3) and the respective equilibrium
monitoring intensities and deposit rates, we can express banks’ expected proﬁts as:
π
IL = βE
½
p
ILR − y −
c
2
(m
IL)
2
¾
,( 1 1 )
π
ML = βE{p
MLR − y − k
c
2
(m
ML)
2} (12)
11if banks lend individually or share lending, respectively. The terms in parenthesis
represent, in order, the expected return of each project, the return from the alter-
native investment −which is equal from (4) and (10) to the expected repayments to
depositors −, and total monitoring costs.
Banks choose the lending structure that maximizes their expected proﬁts. Their
choice depends on the relative diﬀerences between per-project success probabilities
−and, therefore, per-project total monitoring intensities− and each bank’s total mon-
itoring costs in (11) and (12). Banks’ preferred lending structure is socially optimal,
since they internalize all the beneﬁts.
Given the diﬃcult analytical expressions for the equilibrium monitoring intensi-
ties and the expected shortfalls, we characterize banks’ optimal choice with numer-
ical simulations. We ﬁrst compare monitoring intensities and monitoring costs with
individual-bank and multiple-bank lending; then we look at banks’ proﬁts in the two
games. In all simulations we ﬁx pH =0 .8, pL =0 .6, y =1a n dβ =1 2 ,w h e r e a sw e
allow E, c,a n dR to vary as speciﬁed below. Choosing β = 12 corresponds to capital
requirements equal to 8%.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how individual and per-project total monitoring inten-
sities and total monitoring costs change as a function of the number of banks k when
the amount of inside equity varies from E =0 .5t oE =1 .5, the project return is
R =1 .52, and the cost of monitoring is c =0 .35.9
Insert Figures 2 and 3
Figure 2 shows that, whereas the individual monitoring intensity always decreases
with the number of banks k, the per-project total monitoring intensity increases with
k for k ≥ 2i fE =0 .5, whereas it decreases if E =1 .5. The intuition is as follows.
Banks with little inside equity cannot diversify much when lending individually. All
else equal, they are subject to a more severe moral hazard problem and exert a low
level of monitoring. Sharing lending allows banks to ﬁnance more projects. This
reduces their moral hazard problem and tends to increase monitoring. The marginal
impact of greater diversiﬁcation on banks’ monitoring incentive is important enough
to dominate the drawbacks of free-riding and duplication of eﬀo r t sa n dl e a dt oh i g h e r
per-project total monitoring for k ≥ 2. On the contrary, banks with a large amount
of inside equity can reach a great enough level of diversiﬁcation also when lending
9It is possible to analyze monitoring intensities and total monitoring costs (as well as banks’
expected proﬁts below) simply as function of k because for k = 1 expressions (9) and (12) coincide
with (3) and (11), respectively. That is, k = 1 can be seen as a special case of multiple-bank lending.
12individually. Thus ,they face a weak moral hazard problem and exert a high monitor-
ing intensity. Sharing lending decreases both individual and per-project monitoring
intensities as free-riding and duplication of eﬀorts dominate.
As illustrated in Figure 3, total monitoring costs always decrease with k.T h e
reduction is more pronounced if the amount of inside equity is high because in this
case the individual monitoring intensity decreases rapidly with k.
Similar mechanisms link monitoring intensities and total monitoring costs to
project return and cost of monitoring. One can show that, even when the amount of
inside equity is low, the per-project total monitoring intensity decreases with k if c
is low or R is high; and total monitoring costs still decrease with k in all cases. A
low c (a high R) implies that banks have a weak moral hazard problem and exert a
high level of monitoring also when lending individually (this can be easily seen from
equation (3)). Sharing lending reduces monitoring intensities and costs because diver-
siﬁcation has a small impact on banks’ monitoring incentives. The contrary happens
when c is high or R is low.10
To summarize all of this discussion:
Lemma 1 The per-project total monitoring intensity increases eventually with the
number of banks k i ft h ea m o u n to fi n s i d ee q u i t ya n dt h ep r o j e c tr e t u r na r el o w ,a n d
the cost of monitoring is high. The individual monitoring intensity always decreases
with k.
Lemma 2 Total monitoring costs decrease with the number of banks k.S u c har e -
d u c t i o ni sm o r ep r o n o u n c e di ft h ea m o u n to fi n s i d ee q u i t ya n dt h ep r o j e c tr e t u r na r e
high, and the cost of monitoring is low.
We now turn to banks’ expected proﬁts. In Figure 4 we ﬁx R =1 .52 and c =0 .35,
and depict how banks’ expected proﬁts change as a function of the number of banks
k when the amount of inside equity increases from E =0 .5t oE =1 .5. Then we
ﬁx E =0 .5 and analyze in Figures 5 and 6 how banks’ expected proﬁts change as a
function of k when, respectively, the cost of monitoring decreases from c =0 .35 to
c =0 .25 and the project return grows from R =1 .52 to R =1 .62.
Insert Figures 4, 5 and 6
10A positive relationship between monitoring cost and total monitoring intensity is also found by
Winton (1993) in the context of shareholders’ monitoring. Note, however, that, whereas the result
in Winton is due entirely to the convexity of the monitoring cost function, here it depends on the
marginal eﬀect of the greater diversiﬁcation achievable with multiple-bank lending. See also the
discussion in Section 3.
13Figure 4 shows that banks’ expected proﬁts are higher with multiple-bank lending
than with individual-bank lending if E =0 .5, whereas the opposite happens if E =
1.5. Figures 5 and 6 show that multiple-bank lending is more proﬁtable if c =0 .35
and R =1 .52, whereas individual-bank lending is more proﬁtable otherwise. The
intuition behind these results hinges on Lemmas 1 and 2. If E is low, increasing
k implies higher per-project total monitoring intensity and thus higher per-project
success probability in (12) than in (11). Together with lower total monitoring costs,
this makes multiple-bank lending optimal. This result is not due to the diseconomies
of scale in monitoring but on the eﬀect of greater diversiﬁcation on banks’ monitoring
incentives. In fact, as Lemma 2 states, the reduction in total monitoring costs as k
increases is more pronounced when individual-bank lending is optimal.
Similarly, the positive relationship between per-project total monitoring and num-
ber of banks k explains the optimality of multiple-lending when the cost of monitoring
is high and project return is low. To sum up:
Proposition 3 Banks prefer multiple-bank lending if the amount of inside equity and
ﬁrms’ proﬁtability are low, and the cost of monitoring is high; they prefer individual-
bank lending otherwise.
4 The Importance of Bank Leverage
The essential idea behind multiple-bank lending is that banks cannot perfectly diver-
sify when acting as single lenders. Greater diversiﬁcation decreases the variance of the
distribution of the average portfolio return and improves banks’ incentives to moni-
tor. Higher monitoring reduces the expected shortfalls and the deposit rate promised
to depositors. This in turn improves banks’ incentives further as it allows them to
appropriate a larger fraction of the monitoring beneﬁts. This incentive mechanism
works if and only if banks raise deposits, i.e., if they are leveraged. If banks are
non-leveraged, diversiﬁcation does not aﬀect their monitoring incentives through the
expected shortfalls and multiple-bank lending is no longer optimal despite implying
lower total monitoring costs.
To show the importance of bank leverage, we depict in Figure 7 how the expected
proﬁts of leveraged and non-leveraged banks change as a function of the number of
banks k for the same parameter conﬁguration as in Figure 4 for which leveraged banks
choose multiple-bank lending, i.e., E =0 .5, c =0 .35, and R =1 .52.
Insert Figure 7
14Figure 7 shows that the expected proﬁts of non-leveraged banks decrease with k,
whereas those of leveraged banks increase. As mentioned above, the reason is that
multiple-bank lending always lead to lower per-project total monitoring when banks
are non-leveraged. This is shown in Figure 8, where the behavior of the per-project
total monitoring intensities of leveraged and non-leveraged banks is depicted as a
function of the number of banks k sharing lending.
Insert Figure 8
Figures 8 and 9 together imply that multiple-bank lending is no more optimal when
banks are non-leveraged because the “negative” reduction in the per-project mon-
itoring intensity dominates the “positive” decrease in total monitoring costs. The
following proposition generalizes this result; and it strengthens Proposition 3 in that
it suggests once again that the optimality of multiple-bank lending is not driven by
the form of the monitoring cost function.
Proposition 4 Non-leveraged banks do not have incentives to enter into multiple-
bank lending relationships if
∆pR
c is suﬃciently large.
Proof: See the Appendix.
So far we have derived our results under the (somewhat implicit) assumption that
when banks are leveraged, they raise the maximum amount of deposits they can
lend, i.e., D =( β − 1)E. After the discussion above, however, one may wonder
whether banks would not prefer to raise a lower amount of deposits, if any at all.
Raising deposits allows banks to expand their portfolios, but it also worsens their
moral hazard problem. We show now that this is not the case. We start with the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 Banks have incentives to raise a positive amount of deposits.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 7 relies on the idea that ﬁnancing investment projects is proﬁtable and a
small amount of deposits does not originate a severe moral hazard problem. But do
banks want to raise the maximum amount of deposits that they can invest given the
capital requirements? To see this, we use once again numerical simulations. Figure
9 depicts how banks’ expected proﬁts change as a function of the number of banks
k when the amount of deposits increases from a case where capital requirements are
15not binding (D =4 .5) to one where they are (D =5 .5). All of the other parameters
are as in Figure 4 when multiple-bank lending is optimal, i.e., E =0 .5, R =1 .52,
and c =0 .35.
Insert Figure 9
Figure 9 shows that banks ﬁnd it optimal to raise an amount of deposits equal to
D =( β − 1)E =5 .5; their expected proﬁts are increasing in D in the optimal region
of multiple-bank lending. The eﬀect of greater diversiﬁcation dominates, and banks
ﬁnd it optimal to raise the maximum amount of deposits they can invest and diversify
as much as possible. One can show that banks want to do this also when individual-
bank lending is optimal, since their expected proﬁts are still increasing in D in that
case.
5D i s c u s s i o n o f t h e B a s i c M o d e l
In this section we analyze various aspects of the basic model. In particular, we
discuss the role of capital requirements, other limitations to banks’ lending capacities
and diversiﬁcation opportunities, and alternative monitoring technologies and cost
functions.
Limits to diversiﬁcation
Banks’ incentives to enter into multiple—bank relationships originate from the need of
increasing portfolio diversiﬁcation and reaching higher per-project monitoring. The
main underlying assumption is that banks have limited lending capacities, and they
may not be able to diversify enough when lending to ﬁrms individually. In the model
lending capacities are restricted by capital requirements. This idea is in line with the
literature on delegated monitoring and capital-constrained lending (e.g., Holmstrom
and Tirole, 1997; Thakor, 1996; Chiesa, 2001; Almazan, 2002).
T h ec o n c e p to fc a p i t a lr e q u i r e m e n t sw eh a v ei nm i n di sq u i t eb r o a d .T h ep a r a m e -
ter β of our model encompasses any capital constraint which may limit lending, such
as regulatory, eﬀective or also market capital requirements.11 More generally, any
story which limits lending diversiﬁcation possibilities is in line with our theory. Ex-
amples are restrictions on banks’ geographical scope and sector specialization. Even
11“Eﬀective” capital requirements may include a buﬀer above the regulatory minimum to cush-
ion banks against unexpected negative shocks and protect them against falling below regulatory
minimum (Berger, 1995, Berger et al., 1995); “market” capital requirements refer to the amount of
capital the market requires banks to possess as price against default risk (Flannery and Rangan,
2002).
16though regulatory restrictions to geographical expansion have been mostly abolished
in the last decades, many factors limiting banks’ ease to lend in distant regions are
still in place. There is evidence that monitoring ﬁrms located at distant locations
involves higher costs due to information problems, transportation costs, and, espe-
cially if located in foreign regions, diﬀerences in legal systems, supervisory regimes,
corporate governance, language, and cultural conditions (Acharya et al., 2004).12 The
need of expertise may increase monitoring costs (Almazan, 2002) and worsen the eﬀec-
tiveness of monitoring (Winton, 1999), thus limiting banks’ lending capacities across
sectors. As in our model, in such cases banks may prefer to enter into multiple-bank
relationships and increase diversiﬁcation with a lower fraction of more costly loans.
The choice between individual-bank and multiple-bank lending resembles also the
trade-oﬀ between specialization and diversiﬁcation across sectors in terms of corre-
lation among projects (e.g., Hellwig, 1998; Winton, 1999). If specializing implies
lower monitoring costs but higher correlations among projects, the choice between
individual-bank and multiple-bank lending can be seen as a trade-oﬀ between risk
and costs. Banks may choose to share lending to achieve greater diversiﬁcation with
lower costs.
Alternative diversiﬁcation opportunities
So far we have assumed that, for a given level of inside equity, banks can expand
their portfolios only by entering into multiple-bank relationships. Of course, there
are other ways in which banks could relax capital requirements and increase lending
capacities. The most immediate way is raising outside equity. This solution can be,
however, quite costly. First, raising outside equity may not improve banks’ monitoring
incentives, since, diﬀerently from raising debt, it does not reduce their incentives to
exploit external ﬁnanciers when diversiﬁcation increases (Cerasi and Daltung, 2000).
Second, in a context where banks act as liquidity providers, raising outside equity
worsens such a valuable function (Diamond and Rajan, 2000). Finally, as is well
known from the corporate ﬁnance literature, raising outside equity implies some costs
in terms of foregone tax advantages, asymmetric information, and transaction costs
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984).13 Thus, allowing banks
to raise outside equity may not change their choice of sharing lending. Whenever
individual-bank lending is not optimal, banks would weigh the costs of multiple-bank
lending against the costs of raising outside equity, and would still choose to share
12See also Degryse and Ongena (2003) for an extensive survey on the geographical scope of banking.
13See also Smith (1986) for empirical evidence on the costs of raising equity.
17lending if this implies higher proﬁts.
Another alternative way for banks to increase lending is to merge. Mergers lead
to higher inside equity and, if occurring across diﬀerent geographical areas or sec-
tors, allow banks to invest in more distant and more independent projects. This
expands lending and improves diversiﬁcation. However, mergers also involve some
costs. By creating larger organizations, they may lead to more severe agency prob-
lems, organizational diseconomies and distortions linked to the implicit too-big-to fail
guarantee.14
Finally, also information sharing may aﬀect banks’ incentives to enter into multiple-
bank relationships. Regardless of whether this is provided through public credit
registers or private bureaus, sharing information about borrowers’ performances can
substitute −at least to some extent− for private monitoring, thus reducing banks’
monitoring costs.15 This increases the attractiveness of individual-bank lending, but it
does not allow banks to increase diversiﬁcation. Thus, banks may still prefer multiple-
bank lending when the incentive eﬀect of diversiﬁcation dominates.
Alternative monitoring technologies
The monitoring technology we have assumed so far gives banks a direct form of
control on ﬁrms’ behavior. Monitoring allows banks to observe ﬁrms’ project choices
and intervene in case of misbehavior. Other forms of control are, however, plausible.
For example, through monitoring banks could observe ﬁrms’ behavior and liquidate
them for a total value of C (e.g., Rajan and Winton, 1995; Park, 2000). Whether
this leads to diﬀerent results for the optimality of multiple-bank lending depends on
how the liquidation value C is allocated among banks. The results of the basic model
still hold if banks share C equally in case of default independently of whether they
monitor. Results may diﬀer, however, if a monitoring bank is the ﬁrst to seize C.T h i s
reduces free-riding, but it may reduce the attractiveness of multiple-bank lending if
it leads to excessive duplication of eﬀorts.
Monitoring cost function
So far we have assumed that monitoring costs are convex. As shown in Proposition
4, however, what is crucial for our theory is the fact that banks are leveraged rather
14See Carletti et al. (2002) for a discussion of the eﬀects of bank mergers on diversiﬁcation
opportunities and risk taking; Degryse and Ongena (2003) for a more speciﬁc discussion of the
eﬀects of cross-border mergers; and Cerasi and Daltung (2002) for an analysis of organizational
diseconomies.
15See Jappelli and Pagano (2002) for a description of the diﬀerent types of information sharing
agreements across countries.
18than the exact form of the monitoring cost function. Therefore, although convex costs
overestimate the optimality of multiple-bank lending because they imply diseconomies
of scale in monitoring, our qualitative results are robust to various modiﬁcations of
the cost function. Assuming linear costs, overloading costs, or some initial ﬁxed costs
would reduce the range of parameters for which multiple-bank lending is optimal, but
it would not modify our qualitative insights.
6 Empirical Implications
The model has several empirical implications. First, the amount of inside equity
relates to the relative size of banks and ﬁrms. Thus, the model predicts a great use of
multiple-bank lending when banks are small relative to the projects they ﬁnance, since
in this case they cannot diversify much when lending individually. This prediction is
consistent with the ﬁnding in Ongena and Smith (2000b) of little use of multiple-bank
lending in more concentrated banking systems.
Second, the model predicts that banks should prefer multiple-bank lending when
ﬁrms are less proﬁtable. This is in line with Detragiache et al. (2000), who ﬁnd
a positive relationship between individual-bank lending and ﬁrms’ proﬁtability; and
it also suggests that monetary policy may aﬀect banks’ lending choices. Even if so
f a rw eh a v ec o n s i d e r e dﬁrms’ proﬁtability in terms of return from the risky projects,
one can show that similar (but inverse) results hold for the return of the alternative
safe investment. An increase in the riskless interest rate makes multiple-bank lending
relatively more attractive as it reduces ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. Thus the model predicts
that, by raising riskless interest rates, a tight monetary policy induces banks to enter
into multiple bank relationships. If then monetary policy is counter-cyclical, multiple-
bank lending should occur more frequently during periods of expansionary economic
activity.16
Third, the cost of monitoring refers to the ease with which banks can acquire
information about ﬁrms; and it is linked to disclosure and accounting standards,
and the eﬃciency of the judicial system. Also, to the extent that they aﬀect banks’
acquisition information in diﬀerent sectors or geographical areas, the size of the cost of
monitoring depends on the degree of ﬁnancial integration and the level of regulatory
16Several papers have discussed the negative eﬀect of a tighter monetary policy on banks’ moni-
toring incentives and lending (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Repullo and Suarez, 2000; Chiesa,
2001; and Almazan, 2002). Our paper suggests that banks could avoid lowering credit by entering
into multiple-bank relationships. In this respect, our paper is in line with Thakor (1996), who shows
that a tight monetary policy does not necessarily lower lending.
19restrictions. The more integrated and the less regulated markets are, the lower the
cost of monitoring. Thus, the model predicts that multiple-bank lending should
occur in countries with laxer accounting and disclosure standards, more ineﬃcient
judicial systems, less integrated and less regulated markets. This prediction is partly
supported by Detragiache et al.(2000), and Ongena and Smith (2000b), who ﬁnd
greater use of multiple-bank lending in countries with more ineﬃcient judicial systems
and poorer enforcement of creditor rights. Also, the ﬁnding in Berger et al. (2003)
that ﬁrms frequently use local host nation banks seems to support our prediction of
greater use of multiple-bank relationships, when geographical distance increases the
cost of monitoring and makes individual diversiﬁcation more diﬃcult.
Finally, the model has some predictions concerning diversiﬁcation opportunities
rather than multiple-bank lending. In particular, the model predicts a negative rela-
tionship between the use of multiple-bank lending and the strength of equity markets,
as found in Ongena and Smith (2000b). Also, the model suggests that banks should
make less use of multiple-bank lending after a process of mergers and acquisitions.
This seems to be in line with the ﬁndings in Sapienza (2002) and Karceski et al.(2003)
that banks are more likely to terminate a certain lending relationship after they merge,
in particular when borrowers are ﬁrms of small size or ﬁrms borrowing from multiple
banks.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzes banks’ incentives to enter into multiple-bank relationships with
other banks in a context where both ﬁrms and banks are subject to moral hazard, and
monitoring is essential. Banks choose multiple-bank lending whenever the beneﬁto f
greater diversiﬁcation in terms of higher overall monitoring dominates the drawbacks
of free-riding and duplication of eﬀorts. The incentive mechanism of diversiﬁcation
works only if banks raise deposits, since otherwise diversiﬁcation does not aﬀect mon-
itoring incentives. The attractiveness of multiple-bank lending decreases with the
amount of inside equity and ﬁrms’ proﬁtability, whereas it increases with the cost of
monitoring.
The main result of the paper, namely that multiple-bank lending can increase over-
all monitoring, contrasts sharply with Diamond’s theory of banks as delegated moni-
tors, and it provides a new alternative to the hold-up and the soft-budget-constraint
theories in explaining why banks may want to enter into multiple-bank relationships.
The results are particularly applicable to small and medium business lending, but the
20paper sheds light also on some aspects of syndicated lending. This can be considered
as a special form of multiple-bank lending in that a lead bank (and, in many cases,
several lead banks) originates a loan and decides to share it with other banks. As in
our model, banks syndicate loans to overcome capital constraints and limited lending
capacities (Simons, 1993) and are more likelyt od os oa st h e i rc a p i t a lr a t i o sd e c l i n e ,
and when they are unable to originate loans in distant regions or diﬀerent sectors
(Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000).
We develop the analysis under the assumption that all banks share ﬁnancing
equally when they enter into multiple-bank relationships. Allowing for asymmetric
shares of ﬁnancing would lead to results somewhere between those obtained with sym-
metric shares, and might explain some other important features of banking systems
such as the emergence and the role of “housebanks”. This analysis constitutes an
interesting avenue for future research.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
For a given r, the bank chooses mi to maximize (2). The ﬁrst order condition gives
∂π
∂mi
= ∆pR +
∂S
∂mi
D − cmi =0 , ∀i =1 ,...,D + E.
Solving for a symmetric equilibrium gives (3). Setting (1) equal to y after substituting
mIL gives (4). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
For a given rj, each bank j chooses mij to maximize (8). The ﬁrst order condition
gives
∂πk
j
∂mij
=
∆pR
k
Y
s6=j
(1−mis)+
∂Sk
∂mij
D−cmij =0 , for = 1...k and i =1 ,...,k(D+E).
Substituting mij = mML in a symmetric equilibrium gives (9). Setting (7) equal to y
after substituting mML gives (10). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
For a given k, the expected proﬁt of a non-leveraged bank (D =0 )i s
π =
kE X
i=1
½
p
k
i
R
k
−
y
k
−
c
2
m
2
ij
¾
.( 1 3 )
21Each bank chooses mij to maximize (13). The ﬁrst order condition gives
∆pR
k
Y
s6=j
(1 − mis) − cmij =0 , for j =1 ,....,k and i =1 ,...,k(D + E).
The system has only one symmetric solution, which is given by
(1 − ˆ m)
k−1∆pR − kcˆ m =0 . ( 1 4 )
It follows that the equilibrium monitoring intensity ˆ m is non-increasing in k.I fk =1 ,
the bank is lending individually. In this case ˆ m =1 ,i f
∆pR
c ≥ 1. For all k>1, ˆ m<1.
Substituting ˆ m into (13) gives the equilibrium expected proﬁt of each bank
ˆ π = E
½
ˆ pR − y − k
c
2
(ˆ m)
2
¾
.( 1 5 )
Neglecting indivisibilities, the ﬁrst order condition of (15) with respect to k is
−
c
2
(ˆ m)
2 +
h
k(1 − ˆ m)
k−1∆pR − kcˆ m
i ∂ ˆ m
∂k
− (1 − ˆ m)
k∆pRln(1 − ˆ m) ≤ 0. (16)
The ﬁrst term is negative, the second term is non-positive, while the last one is non-
negative. The ﬁrst term is the additional cost of monitoring more projects when
banks share lending. The second term represents the eﬀect of the decrease in the
individual monitoring intensity of all banks as k increases. This eﬀect is negative if
ˆ m<1, and it is zero otherwise. The last term is the increase in the project success
probability when an additional bank monitors the project. This eﬀect is positive as
long as ˆ m is less than one; when the project is already fully monitored there is no
beneﬁt from having an additional monitor.
For k = 1 the Envelope Theorem applies to ˆ m, and (16) reduces to
−
c
2
(ˆ m)
2 − (1 − ˆ m)∆pRln(1 − ˆ m) ≤ 0. (17)
The left hand side is negative if ˆ m =1 . Hence, if the bank chooses to monitor with
intensity equal to one, it has no incentive to share lending. If
∆pR
c < 1, (14) is
binding. Substituting it into (17) gives
−
1
2
∆pR
c
− (1 −
∆pR
c
)ln(1−
∆pR
c
) ≤ 0,
which is fulﬁlled for
∆pR
c > 0.72. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
For a given amount of deposits D,b a n k s ’e q u i l i b r i u me x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts are given by
22(D + E)
½
e pR− y − k
c
2
(f m)
2
¾
,
where f m is the solution to
∆pR
k
(1 − f m)
k−1 +
∂S
∂m
D − cf m =0 ,
and
e r − S(f m, e r)=y,
with e p = pH − (1 − f m)k∆p. The derivative of the expected proﬁts with respect to D
gives
½
e pR − y −
c
2
(f m)
2
¾
+( D + E)
h
k(1 − f m)
k−1∆pR − kcf m
i ∂f m
∂D
≥ 0. (18)
For k = 1, (18) is strictly positive at D = 0, since the Envelope Theorem then holds
with respect to f m.F o rk>1, the Envelope Theorem does not hold because a change
in D aﬀects the monitoring intensities of all banks k i nt h es a m ew a y . H o w e v e r ,a
small increase in D has a small impact on f m so that, if project lending is proﬁtable
enough, each bank has an incentive to raise deposits. Q.E.D.
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